The Shi’a and
Sunni opposition is viewed as sectarian in nature which is defined as a
conflict defined by an “institutional set of arrangements determining familial,
local, regional, and even broader kinds of loyalty and affiliation” (Abdo, p.5,
2013). In this particular ideological
conflict, and thus political conflict, “a struggle for political and economic
power and over which interpretation of Islam will influence societies” (Abdo,
p.5, 2013) has existed since the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the
establishment of modern states within the modern Middle East. While the teachings of Muhammad were
generally positive reform which did not promote secularism within those who have
submitted to God, it did not take long for a secularist division to occur after
the completion of his life as “Shiites wanted the prophet to be succeeded by
Ali ibn Abi Talib, his son-in-law and cousin, and then by his descendants
thereafter” (Cole, p.20, 2006) while “the Sunni branch was content to have
caliphs-the respected elders of the prophet's tribe-succeed him” (Cole, p. 20,
2006). In general, the division
originated over the religious and political leadership succession after
Muhammad between “Mohammad’s closest companions, or only from his direct
bloodline” (Abdo, p. 5, 2013). There are
over 1.3 billion Muslims in the world, either Shiite or Sunni, and until
recently the majority of Arab states in the Middle East have been dominated by
Sunni regimes (Cole, p.20, 2006).
Demographics on
the religion of Islam state that Muslims globally are “10-13% are Shia Muslims
and 87-90% are Sunni Muslims” (Pew, 2014) and that “most Shias (between 68% and
80%) live in just four countries: Iran, Pakistan, India and Iraq” (Pew,
2014). The Shiite-Sunni divide impacts
regional stability, and therefore regional security, on several levels. In many cases, individual states with
majority Shiite populations have been repressing by a Sunni ruling regime such
as Iraq or Bahrain, or a large minority of Shiites ruled by a Sunni regimes in
Lebanon or Saudi Arabia (Cole, p. 20, 2006).
In states such as
Bahrain and Lebanon, where the Shi‘ite comprise approximately 70 and 40 percent
of the population, respectively, the prospects of democratic governance alarm
the Sunni” (Abdo, p.5, 2013). When
domestic events, especially when they are influenced by foreign powers, shift
the Shiite-Sunni power structure in Middle East state regimes, it changes the
regional power structure which in turn causes internationals shifts. One example of domestic state realignments
that impacts the region was how “the US ouster of the Sunni dictatorship
politically unleashed Iraq's Shiite majority” (Cole, p. 20, 2006). The U.S. invasion and nation-building in Iraq
allowed “fundamentalist Shiite parties to come to power through the ballot box”
(Cole, p.22, 2006) and instantly changed the way Iraq dealt with its regional
neighbors and their allies as “Iran already had a clerically run Shiite
government” (Cole, p.22, 2006). The U.S.
invasion clearly changed the power structure, and stability, in the region
because “before the Iraq War, the region had been characterized by a
Sunni-dominated, secular Iraq; a Sunni Jordan; a Sunni-majority Syria with a
secular Baath government; a Sunni Palestine; a Lebanon dominated jointly by
Maronite Christians and Sunni Muslims; and a Sunni Saudi Arabia and Gulf”
(Cole, p.22, 2006).
Political parties
have also begun to form with the Shiite ranks, some of which have endorsed
violence, within the nation-state structures left behind by the imperialist
west. In Iraq during the 2005 elections,
Shiite parties “formed a single party list, the United Iraqi Alliance” (Cole,
p. 21, 2006). As authoritarian leader
are removed by foreign governments or forced out by Arab protests, such as in
Egypt and Libya, the sectarianism within domestic political parties that appear
in the regime void “are now emerging as powerful mobilizing forces in the
region and as potent sources of regional instability and conflict” (Abdo, p.
59, 2013).
The
shifting of power balance resulting from Shiite-Sunni regime changes within the
natural resource-rich Middle Eastern region causes the capitalist west to play
political chess when it comes to carrots and sticks. This is not a new concept as the U.S.
actually backed Iraq during the 1980s Iran-Iraq War in hopes for “Hussein to
bottle up fundamentalist Shiism and to keep it from having a major impact in
Iraq and the Gulf” (Cole, p.25, 2006).
After the removal of Hussein and the establishment of a Shiite Iraq
government, “once-isolated Iran has emerged as a major regional player” (Cole,
p.25, 2006) and is “developing warm and positive links with newly
Shiite-dominated Baghdad, and exercising new influence in the Persian Gulf”
(Cole, p.25, 2006). This causes the
capitalist West to seek alliances in strange places, or wherever they can
stabilize the region through a balance of power aimed to keep two political
entities competing against each other and looking for support from Western
capital and arms. When the power of
Shiite Iran was balanced by pre-U.S. invaded Sunni Iraq, the capital west had
stronger negotiating power by negotiating with both sides, but “since the fall
of Saddam Hussein in 2003 and in the absence of a strong Iraq, which had
traditionally served as a counterbalance to Iran’s regional aspirations” (Abdo,
p. 52, 2013). The rise of more Shiite
regimes in the Middle East allows Iran to extend political relations with those
states in order to “give Iran leverage in its relations with the United States,
the European Union, and other large powers” (Abdo, p. 51, 2013) as a collective
negotiator.
Abdo, Geneive. 2013. The New Sectarianism: The Arab
Uprisings and the Rebirth of the Shi’a-Sunni Divide, Washington DC: The Saban
Center for Middle East Policy.
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2013/04/sunni%20shia%20abdo/sunni%20shia%20abdo.pdf
Cole, Juan. 2006. “A Shi’ite Crescent? The regional impact of the Iraq War.” Current History.
http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy1.apus.edu/docview/200761710?accountid=8289
Pew Forum Religion and Public Life Project. 2014.
Mapping the Global Muslim Population.
Accessed on May 24, 2014. http://www.pewforum.org/2009/10/07/mapping-the-global-muslim-population/
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