The effect of free trade on so-called
developing states is an adverse one, and is only different from colonialism in
the fact that under globalization it is now the private sector exploiting the
natural resources of the so-called developing state in order to generate
private sector capital instead of the state exploiting the natural resources of
an occupied colony.
The
North-South economic divide did not occur overnight and imperialism in the form
of colonialism played a major part in creating states that are currently
referred to under globalization as developing states. In order to provide a few examples of this
phenomenon, Brazil “was a Portuguese colony” (Kesselman, Krieger, & Joseph,
2013, 388) that was allowed independence in 1822, “Spain ruled Mexico for three
centuries” (Kesselman, Krieger, & Joseph, 2013, 437), and “Nigeria was a
British colony from 1914 until 1960” (Kesselman, Krieger, & Joseph, 2013,
183). The phenomenon of colonization
molded “one part of the globe into a chiefly agricultural field of production,
for supplying the other part which remains a chiefly industrial field” (Marx,
1867), and this division evolved the under globalization to include exploited
and consumer states.
It may be
noted that the deregulation and the privatization of a so-called developing
state’s natural resources occurs, after being trapped under excessive national debt,
through conditional loans from the IMF and World Bank, now known as Structural
Adjustment Programs (SAPs), which are forced on states on the brink of failure
due to unbalanced debt to GDP ratios while regional trade blocs allow
multi-national (or non-state) private sector corporations to exploit natural
resources and cheap labor in developing states while moving natural resources
and finished manufactured products to consumer states with no tariff
barriers. In 1982, Mexico was among one
of the first SAP packages “under the close guidance of the IMF and the World
Bank” (Benería, 1999, p.1) and was basically a response to the “international
financial community to the prevailing fear of the financial crisis that could
have developed if many governments defaulted” (Benería, 1999, p.1). IMF and World Bank SAPs are aimed “to shift
resources and economic activity from the public to the private sector”
(Benería, 1999, p.2) and the “easing of rules regulating foreign investment,
increasing the degree of globalization of the economy and emphasizing the
production of tradables over non-tradables” (Benería, 1999, p.2) by those
entities with the most private capital to invest, hence foreign capital
infiltrating the so-called developing state.
What once
was colonial exploitation by states has shifted to exploitation by
multi-national private sector entities backed by a Bretton Woods structure of
globalization established by agencies such as the IMF, World Bank, and the
World Trade Organization. Brazil opened
their doors to foreign private sector infiltration in 1990 under Fernando
Collor de Mello, who “agreed to put Brazil on the path of free-market policies
with reforms that included the privatization of state enterprises and the
deregulation of the economy” (Kesselman, Krieger, & Joseph, 2013, 404). In the early 1990s, NAFTA and “the
liberalization of the Mexican economy and opening of its markets to foreign
competition increased Mexico’s vulnerability” (Kesselman, Krieger, &
Joseph, 2013, 450) to foreign private sector exploitation as “deregulation gave
the private sector more freedom” (Kesselman, Krieger, & Joseph, 2013,
450). Finally, during the second half of
the 1980s Nigeria adopted a structural adjustment program “with active support
from the World Bank and IMF” (Kesselman, Krieger, & Joseph, 2013, 539) which
promoted a policy that “state-owned businesses would be sold to private
(nonstate) investors, domestic or foreign” (Kesselman, Krieger, & Joseph,
2013, 539).
The recent
trend of regional trade blocs have followed closely on the heels of successful SAPs
which have resulted in deregulated state ownership of natural resources in
so-called developing states, and that trend has allowed the private sector, or
multi-national (non-state) corporate entities, to invest (exploit) natural
resources and cheap labor from so-called developing states and move
manufactured products across state borders to consumer states without being
charged tariffs in order to regenerate capital off of the so-called developing
state’s natural resources, which are now owned, in many cases, by the same private
sector entities after the implementation of the International Financial Institutions
conditional SAPs on the so-called developing state.
All three
so-called developing states discussed belong to trade blocs. While Mexico is a member of the North America
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Brazil is a member of the trading bloc Mercosur
with member states Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela which allows private
sector tariff-free movements of natural resources. This is illustrated by the fact that “Mercosur
exports have grown to $61.89 billion in 1994 from an annual average of S34
billion for the 1984-86 period” (Hudgins, 2012) while “purchases from the U.S.
grew to $17 billion in 1995 from $6.68 billion in 1990” (Hudgins, 2012) as a
result that “Mercosur countries have been reducing trade barriers to nonmember
countries as part of their World Trade Organization commitments” (Hudgins,
2012). Nigeria is a member of the Organization
of the Islamic Conference (OIC) which is comprised of “54 independent Muslim
states” (Naqvi, 1998, p.285), many of them post-colonial possessions,
consisting of a “high degree of concentration of economic activity: more than
half of its GDP, exports and imports come from just six countries” (Naqvi, 1998,
p.285).
Free
trade may provide short-term hope for the developing state choking on
international debt, but is primarily aimed at generating capital by a parasitic
private sector through the extraction of natural resources from so-called
developing states. It allows the
exploitation and exhaustion of a state’s natural resources, basically
transferring those natural resources into capital that does not remain within the
structure of the state for the future and therefore weakens the state for
future stability. In closing, free trade
is adverse to the long-term future of the so-called developing state.
Resources
Edward Hudgins.
2012. “Mercosur Hasn’t Caused
Trade Diversion.” Cato Institute. Accessed December 27, 2013. http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/mercosur-hasnt-caused-trade-diversion?print
Lourdes Benería.
1999. “Structural Adjustment
Policies.” The Elgar Companion to
Feminist Economists. Accessed
December 26, 2013. http://www.arts.cornell.edu/poverty/Papers/Beneria_SAPs.pdf
Karl Marx.
1867. “Das Kapital.” Public Domain. Accessed on December 26, 2013. http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1867-c1/ch15.htm
Mark Kesselman, Joel Krieger, and William Joseph.
2013. Introduction to Comparative
Politics, 6th edition. Boston, MA: Wadsworth
Syed Nawab Haider Naqvi. 1998. “Globalisation,
Regionalism and the OIC.” Journal of Economic Cooperation Among Islamic
Countries 19, 1-2 (1998):285-308, accessed on December 27, 2013. http://www.sesric.org/jecd/jecd_articles/ART97100112-2.pdf
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