The
causes of World War I were imperialistic in nature and the results of this
conflict were not satisfied with Treaty of Versailles. Many of the imperialistic capitalist state,
and private sector, goals were botched by post-World War I international structural
errors and many of the achieved goals did not reach the possible maximum levels
of capital profitability. These
shortcomings would not be corrected and achieved until after World War II.
Imperialism and World War I
World
War I was started by the imperial motives of Britain, France and pre-October
Revolution Russia, forming the Triple Entente, to hinder, and destroy, the economic-industrial
growth and growing military power of Germany in Europe. As with most major international conflicts,
the spark that started the regional fighting was centered on smaller state
pieces; in the case of World War I those pieces were the states of Serbia and
Austria-Hungary. Allied forces,
supported by the geographically isolated United States and the capitalist private
sector that influence her interests, quickly implemented a naval blockade
around Germany in order to strangulate German supply lines. Despite the creativeness of the German
Schlieffen Plan, a plan for rapidly striking France to the East before quickly
realigning German forces to the western frontier against a slower Russian
military, World War I should have been a quick win for the Allied states, and
the United States should have never been required to physical action. The unforeseen event that prolonged the
conflict and required entry by the United States was the Russian Revolution of
1917 which “began on 24 October, the eve of the meeting of the Second Congress
of Soviets, when the forces of the Soviet’s Military-Revolutionary Committee
began to occupy key government institutions” and “encountered almost no violent
resistance”[1]. With the withdrawal of
Russia, who would be troubled by domestic political struggles after the
revolution, and the entry of United States military and capital power, the World
War I conflict was extended in duration even though Germany’s days were
numbered.
Points, Paris, and Treaties
On
January 8, 1918, United States President Woodrow Wilson gave his famous Fourteen
Points speech where he outlined conditions for possible peace and justified
American entry into the conflict based on the empty concern “that the world be
made fit and safe to live in; and particularly that it be made safe for every
peaceloving nation”[2]. What Wilson
probably meant was that “after the United States came into the war her
financial assistance was lavish and unstinted, and without this assistance the
Allies could never have won the war”[3].
In short, the United States had private sector interests in Europe, and
saw greater possible private sector interests in the war-ravished continent of
Europe.
Approximately ten months after the Fourteen
Points speech, Germany signed the proposed peace armistice on November 11, 1918
and four years of conflict ended with wet blood still drying in the trenches of
the front lines. Within two months after
the cessation of war, the Allied powers, known in history books as the ‘big
four’, met at the Paris Peace Conference in Versailles with many other smaller
state participants to establish terms for post-war peace. Even though “Russia had fought as one of the
Allies until December 1917, when its new Bolshevik Government withdrew from the
war”, the Allied states did not “recognize the new Bolshevik Government and
thus did not invite its representatives to the Peace Conference”[4]. With the late war entry of the United States,
the United States “was not bound to honor pre-existing agreements between the
Allied powers” and President Wilson “strongly opposed many of these
arrangements” to include promises made to Italy in the 1915 Treaty of London[5]. The Treaty of Versailles was presented to
Germany for signature on June 28, 1919.
Reparation Committee and the League of Nations
Two
major creations emerged from the Treaty of Versailles. The first was the Reparations Committee
implemented to oversee Germany’s reparation commitments and abilities, which
many political economists felt too harsh, damaging to Europe as a whole, and
economically impossible. The Reparation
Commission contained “delegates of the United States, Great Britain, France,
and Italy” in all areas concerning German reparation capabilities and decisions
with “diplomatic privileges, and its salaries” paid by Germany[6]. German reparations would later be postponed
until after World War II through the Lausanne Conference in 1932.
The
second creation that was adopted at the Paris Peace Conference was the League
of Nations, an attempt at global governance and international democracy. The League of Nations was built on faulty
wiring from the beginning of its existence.
The first problem that weakened the League of Nations was that the
United States never ratified the treaty to join the League. Despite the fact that “American public
opinion was overwhelming in favor of ratifying the treaty, including the
Covenant of the League of Nations”, U.S. Senate opposition argued that Article
10 “ceded the war powers of the U.S. Government to the League’s Council”[7]. The second, and more problematic, issue in
the structure of the League of Nations was the requirement that decisions could
only be obtained by unanimous vote.
Unanimous vote, the equivalent of equal veto power, greatly illustrated
the ineffectiveness of the League of Nations as an international organization
because various state alliances existed within the League of Nations which created
an environment as if there were no international body in place at all.
Imperial Lessons
The
lessons learned from World War I were many, but there were two very important
lessons for imperial capital powers, especially in the private sector. The first lesson was that the United States
and the capitalist private sector realized new levels of profitability during
the four-year World War I conflict through inter-allied debt accumulated with compound
interest, as well as the profitable accumulation of post-war reconstruction
loans. This realization would eventually lead to the post-World War II Bretton
Woods creations which would end colonial imperialism and begin
globalization. The second realized lesson
was the flaw of equality in any international organization established to
maintain international peace and, more important to post-colonial private
sector interests, stability. Conflict
and reconstruction were profitable opportunities for the private sector, but
instability caused problems for the exportation and exploitation of natural
resources from post-colonial states. The
private sector required an international government body controlled by a only handful
of the strongest military states in order to pick and choose their profit
opportunities whether in the format of stability or conflict. This adjustment would also be corrected after
World War II with the establishment of the United Nations Security Council permanent
member veto.
Notes
[1]
Fitzpatrick, Sheila. 2008. The Russian Revolution, 3rd ed. New York: Oxford Universtity Press, p. 64.
[2]
Wilson, Woodrow. Janruary 8,
1918. Fourteen Points Speech. Public Domain. Accessed from the Fordham Univeristy Website
on July 21, 2013, http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1918wilson.html
[3]
Keynes, John Maynard. 1920. The Economic Consequences of the Peace. Public Domain. P. 298.
[4]
United States Office of the Historian.
The Paris Peace Conference and the Treaty of Versailles, http://history.state.gov/milestones/1914-1920/ParisPeace
[5]
United States Office of the Historian.
The Paris Peace Conference and the Treaty of Versailles, http://history.state.gov/milestones/1914-1920/ParisPeace
[6]
Keynes, John Maynard. 1920. The Economic Consequences of the Peace. Public Domain. P. 251.
[7]
United States Office of the Historian.
The Paris Peace Conference and the Treaty of Versailles, http://history.state.gov/milestones/1914-1920/ParisPeace
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