After a long history of Spanish and British colonization,
the state of Jamaica established independence in 1962. Similar to other post-colonial states,
Jamaica was a state that emerged with a native population suffering from
extreme poverty after decades of foreign exploitation and left in a fragmented
domestic political void. As
post-colonialism evolved to globalization, Jamaica remained stable enough for continued
foreign capital investment-exploitation, and the newly independent island state
did not find itself at war with surrounding states or threatened by further
foreign occupation. The threat to
Jamaica’s security and stability, and the safety of the Jamaican people,
emerged and continues from a domestic threat: gangs.
Post-Colonial
Political Void
Political voids were characteristic of emerging
independent states after decades of colonial occupation by European powers, and
the result was no different in Jamaica as domestic political groups vied for
power. Within ten years of Jamaica’s
independence, the PNP (People's National Party) and JLP (Jamaican Labour Party)
were locked into a grueling battle for domestic political dominance within the
democratic parliamentary system left behind by their British occupiers. After the 1972 election of the PNP’s Michael
Manley, “Jamaica’s ruling elite and foreign backers waged a violent and
debilitating assault on Manley’s government and party to prevent it from
implementing reforms, combining paramilitary assaults on neighbourhoods
supporting the PNP with sabotage of the country’s economy” [1].
The
political gang warfare of the 1970s went both ways as “the two main parties
helped organize and arm in Kingston's poor neighborhoods in the 1970s, gangs
that controlled the streets at the behest of politicians and intimidated voters
at election time”[2]. The PNP was ousted
in the election of 1980 when “the political violence reached its height in
1980, when an estimated 700 people were killed in election-related fighting”
and the JLP won the national vote and has held power since. As a result, the gang problem in Jamaica had
been born, nurtured and strengthened by political sponsorship and unofficial,
and at times official, state support.
Poverty
and Drugs
Poverty in Jamaica has “been a persistent feature of the
Jamaican landscape from the post-Emancipation period”[3]. After the dissolution of political party
funding for gang activities, Jamaican gangs found an independent funding source
in “the introduction of cocaine in the mid-1980s”, as youth amidst
post-colonial poverty began to view “the easiest way to become ‘better off’ was
to buy cocaine and sell it”[4].
As
the amount of people living under the poverty level in Jamaica climbed to “an
all-time high of 45% of the population, combined with an inflation rate of 80%”
in 1991, and previous restraints on gang activities by their political
affiliations that funded and armed them were deteriorating, Jamaican gang
members, with no other viable options, began to violently position gang
alliances throughout the Kingston garrison territories for power positions in
the cocaine game [5].
The drug trade and violent crime in Jamaica were greatly
impacted by the “significant use of the gun in the 1980’s and the illicit drug
trans-shipment trade changed the country’s crime landscape from conflict
between individuals to violent conflict over turf” and eventually became “anchored
in institutionalized relations and occupational roles (subsequent development
of extortion and racketeering) [6].
Modern
Gang Violence and Economic Growth
Today, Jamaica boasts one of the highest murder rates in
the world due to gang violence and drug trafficking. As gang violence continued to develop after
the turn of the century, Jamaica suffered from “1,674 murders in 2005, up from
1,471 murders” in 2004 amidst “gang related fights over drugs and turf” [7]. A 2004 World Bank report written on the violent
crime epidemical erosion on possible economic growth in Jamaica states that “crime
costs society at least 4 percent of GDP explicitly, including lost production,
health expenses, and public and private spending” and that “Some 10-20 percent of
firms in the business survey suggested that they may close down in the next
three years because of crime.” [8]
The gang violence epidemic is debilitating to the Jamaican
state because the majority of gang action and violent crime takes place in
densely populated urban areas trapped under heavy poverty such as Kingston
where “in 2001, about 51 percent of reported violent crimes occurred” [9]. Jamaica has open borders for investment and foreign
vulture capital is flowing into the state, but after natural resources and
cheap labor are extracted by foreign investors, the Jamaican government is
forced to spend her prostitution pay from foreign capital exploitation on
reigning in gang violence and paying off international debt instead of maximum
reinvestment into the social economy of the state.
Conclusion
The origins of gang activity in Jamaica were a direct
result of the political void and extreme poverty left by colonial oppression,
and the violence was grossly accelerated by the political detachment of gangs
and the emergence of cocaine, and later crack-cocaine, in the over-crowed
cities suffering from mass poverty. As
crime and murder rates continue to expand as a result of bloody gang conflicts
over drug territories, the government of Jamaica, which is already under
extreme debt to the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, is unable to
reinvest the foreign capital that is exploiting their domestic natural
resources and cheap labor for profit, because crime stability drains a good
portion of the GDP after the international debtors extract their payments. In the case of Jamaican security and economic
growth, it is no longer a foreign colonial master or a neighboring nation-state
that threatens that security and development.
The largest threat to national security and development, Jamaican gangs,
destroys from within.
Notes
1.
Annis, Roger. Gangs and Violence
in Jamaica and Haiti. Center for
Research on Globalization, June 14, 2010.
Accessed on March 9, 2013 from http://www.globalresearch.ca/gangs-and-violence-in-jamaica-and-haiti/19744
2. Rosenberg, Matthew. Jamaica: 20 Dead in Political Violence. ABC News, July 10, 2013. Accessed on March 9, 2013 from
http://abcnews.go.com/International/story?id=80803&page=1
3. Anderson, Patricia. Poverty in Jamaica: Social Target or Social
Crisis. Columbia University. Souls Journal, 2001, p. 39. Accessed on March 9, 2013 from
http://www.columbia.edu/cu/ccbh/souls/vol3no4/vol3num4art5.pdf
4.
Lolland, J & Moser, C. Urban
Poverty and Violence in Jamaica. World
Bank, Latin American and Caribbean Studies. Washington, D.C, 1997, p. 14-15. Accessed on March 9, 2013 from http://books.google.com/books?id=wQ7Fie43Ld0C&pg=PA15&lpg=PA15&dq=emergence+of+cocaine+in+jamaica&source=bl&ots=1cImBi67my&sig=5daFkzlmhVcPlQPN-JzQIEL9BZ0&hl=en&sa=X&ei=_Z47UaaKHJD82gXDsIDIBw&ved=0CHcQ6AEwBw#v=onepage&q=emergence%20of%20cocaine%20in%20jamaica&f=false
5. Hughes, Wesley. A Historical Perspective on Poverty, The
Transformation of Jamaica Report. Office
of the Prime Minister, 2006. Accessed on
March 9, 2013 from
http://www.pioj.gov.jm/Portals/0/speeches/Poverty%20-%20OPM%20-%20Sept%202006.pdf
6. Gray, Sherrian. Trends in Urban Crime and Violence in
Kingston, Jamaica. UN Habitat Global
Report on Human Settlements 2007, p. 7.
Accessed on March 9, 2013 from
http://www.unhabitat.org/downloads/docs/GRHS.2007.CaseStudy.Crime.Kingston.pdf
7. Biswas, Soutik. Jamaica Struggles to Fight Crime. BBC News, May 16, 2007. Accessed on March 9, 2013 from
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/6657203.stm
8. The Road to Sustained Growth in
Jamaica. World Bank, Washington, D.C.,
2004, p.18-19. Accessed on March 9, 2013
from
http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2004/05/28/000012009_20040528112811/Rendered/PDF/29101.pdf
9. The Road to Sustained Growth in
Jamaica. World Bank, Washington, D.C.,
2004, p.18-19. Accessed on March 9, 2013
from
http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2004/05/28/000012009_20040528112811/Rendered/PDF/29101.pdf
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