Sunday, December 28, 2014

Israeli Intelligence Gathering against the United States: The Impunity of Immunity

In response to Israeli intelligence gathering against the United States, the United States has no choice in accepting these bold actions with a red facial hand print and a straight face because of the amount of political influence that the Israeli lobby holds, whether accumulated from the networking of Jewish capital or the voting power of gentile Christian Zionism, over both political parties of the American representative democratic system.  The leading pro-Israel political influence on American government is the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) which is viewed as the strongest influence on “Congress, where support for pro-Israeli policies is indeed bipartisan and passionately held”[1] by major political party leaders and private sector giants with capital resources to manipulate American foreign policy toward Israel through lobbying contributions, each melting into the American melting pot of the desire for political longevity, corporate capital accumulation, and the ethnic-religious ideology of Zionism.

Pollard and Israeli HUMINT

Allegedly since the Cold War era, Israel has conducted intelligence gathering against the United States in the political, industrial and technological fields, especially in the area of nuclear weapons, and the most frequent method of this intelligence gathering has been in the form of human intelligence (HUMINT), recruiting American citizens or dual Israeli-American citizens to serve as agents for Israel.  One of the most famous cases of Israeli intelligence gathering against the United States is the Jonathan Pollard case.  Pollard, an American born Jew who served as a civilian terrorism analyst for the United States Navy, was arrested on November 21, 1985 and “arraigned in federal district court on several counts of espionage against the United States as a paid agent for the government of Israel.”[2]  Prior to his arrest, Pollard was found seeking political asylum at the Israeli Embassy in Washington.  The state of Israel vigorously denied that Pollard was a paid agent for decades, but eventually acknowledged state sponsorship and publicly apologized to the United States for the infraction, although since this Israeli admission “more Israeli spies have been arrested and convicted by U.S. courts.”[3]  Even though Pollard has yet to be released from prison for “stealing tens of thousands of secrets for Israel”[4], the state of Israel has already issued him Israeli citizenship and has, with strong support from AIPAC pressure on Capitol Hill, continuously attempted to bargain with various U.S. administrations for Pollard’s release, especially during U.S. brokered peace talks between Israel and the Palestinians.  In exchange for campaign funding from AIPAC contributors, both private and corporate, many congressional members have come forward to publicly support Pollard’s release as “Israel and pro-Israel groups in America have long lobbied U.S. administrations to free Pollard”[5].  How absurd it must sound in a state without representative democracy and lobbyist organizations to hear a state representative, sworn to serve the people under them, publicly support the release of an state-born citizen who has committed espionage against his own country on behalf of a foreign government, although it is not a secret that the human element can be easily bought and the ethnic ideology of Zionism has no state borders except expanding Israeli borders.

Another example of Israeli HUMINT recruitment of Americans for intelligence gathering is the case of Richard Kelly Smyth, an American “NATO consultant with a high-level security clearance, indicted for illegally shipping krytrons to Israel -- devices which can, among other uses, trigger nuclear weapons”[6].  While governments are often at play when concerning intelligence gathering against the United States and other states, the private sector motive for capital accumulation is also ever present in international intelligence gathering, as was the case in the Smyth case involving technological devices to trigger nuclear weapons.  In the Smyth case, “Smyth’s company, Milco Incorporated of Huntington Beach, California, acted as the American agent for the deal on behalf of Heli Corporation, an Israeli trading company”[7].

Despite only listing two examples, the list of cases involving Israeli human intelligence gathering against the United States stretches from the Cold War era to the Obama Administration and shares the common characteristics of being publicly downplayed by U.S. administrations and Congressional members of both parties, and left unreported, usually through diversion tactics of excessively reporting on other domestically inflammatory issues, by the media in the United States which is predominantly owned by supporters of Zionism.  Not only is the United States politically paralyzed to take diplomatic actions to protect itself and its private sector corporations against aggressive Israeli intelligence gathering through diplomatic actions aimed to reduce Israeli human intelligence recruiting, heavy pro-Israel lobbying on bipartisan American representative democracy has recently engaged in a long-term campaign aimed to eventually grant Israel acceptance into the U.S. Visa Waiver Program, which would allow Israeli citizens to enter the United States for ninety days or less without a visa.

U.S. Visa Waiver Program and the Agent of a Foreign Power

The United States Visa Waiver Program is a program under the Department of Homeland Security that allows foreign nationals of designated countries to travel to the United States for ninety days or less without first obtaining a visa, which could open a flood gate for human intelligence gathering for a state with such an intelligence gathering history as Israel against the United States[8].  Despite decades of Israeli intelligence gathering against the United States, dual AIPAC sponsored versions of the 2014 “US-Israel Strategic Partnership Act, which includes a clause that would trigger Israel’s entry into the waiver program”[9] easily passed through the U.S. House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate in 2013 and now only awaits reconciliation and presidential signature to become law.  Again the political clout of AIPAC can be easily observed as “in the House, the most partisan branch of U.S. government, less than 10 percent of the representatives regularly vote against AIPAC-backed bills”[10] and the same successful results can be found within the U.S. Senate.  It is impossible for U.S. counter intelligence to compete with foreign lobbying machines when the organization of AIPAC “as a whole has given almost $96 million in congressional campaign contributions”[11] since 1996.  It doesn’t take a signals intelligence (SIGINT) officer to decipher and read this intelligence. 

            The AIPAC organization itself has faced public accusations of being an agent of a foreign government power for decades and has even been investigated for espionage as “the federal government has at times looked into AIPAC”[12].  Steven J. Rosen, “then-director of foreign-policy issues for AIPAC, was investigated in 2007 for collecting classified U.S. information from government officials and passing it on to American reporters and Israeli officials” [13], only to have the U.S. Attorney drop the charges in 2009 under political pressure from civil liberty groups, congressional sub-committee hearings starring bought-and-paid-for Congressional representatives, and current U.S. administration.


            The United States has no options when it comes to possibly taking diplomatic actions to reprimand the state of Israel on a major scale in response to Israeli intelligence gathering against the United States, because any negative actions towards Israel or terminology reprimanding Israel would never make it through the chambers of the U.S. Congress.  The United States must simply silently acknowledge that American representative democracy has been compromised and major reforms are required within Congress and U.S. lobbying laws to protect the United States from intelligence vulnerabilities, although it is highly unlikely those reforms would ever make it out of the House or Senate. 


[1] Fisher, Max.  2013.  “Who’s Afraid of AIPAC: Is Everything We Think About Lobbying and Foreign Policy Wrong?”  Washington Post, October 30, 2013.

[2] McConnell, Jeff.  1986.  “Israeli Spies in the US,” Middle East Report 138, No. 16  (January 1986): 35-45.  Accessed on December 28, 2014.

[3] Stein, Jeff.  2014.  “Israel Won’t Stop Spying on the U.S.”  Newsweek.  May 6, 2014.

[4] Stein, Jeff.  2014.  “Israel Won’t Stop Spying on the U.S.”  Newsweek.  May 6, 2014.

[5] Stein, Jeff.  2014.  “Israel Won’t Stop Spying on the U.S.”  Newsweek.  May 6, 2014.

[6] McConnell, Jeff.  1986.  “Israeli Spies in the US,” Middle East Report 138, No. 16  (January 1986): 35-45.  Accessed on December 28, 2014.

[7] McConnell, Jeff.  1986.  “Israeli Spies in the US,” Middle East Report 138, No. 16  (January 1986): 35-45.  Accessed on December 28, 2014.

[8] Department of Homeland Security.  2014.  “U.S. Customs and Border Protection: Visa Waiver Program”  Accessed December 28, 2014.

[9] Jerusalem Post Staff.  2014.  “Report: US lawmakers wary of Israeli spying hesitate on visa waiver” Jerusalem Post, April 19, 2014.  Accessed on December 28, 2014.

[10] University of Southern California Annenberg Digital Library.  “AIPAC: America’s Pro-Israel Lobby”  University of Southern California, News 21 Archive.  Accessed on December 28, 2014.

[11] University of Southern California Annenberg Digital Library.  “AIPAC: America’s Pro-Israel Lobby”  University of Southern California, News 21 Archive.  Accessed on December 28, 2014.

[12] Lake, Eli.  2011.  “FBI took long look at AIPAC activities”  Washington Times, January 18, 2011.  Accessed on December 28, 2014.

[13] Lake, Eli.  2011.  “FBI took long look at AIPAC activities”  Washington Times, January 18, 2011.  Accessed on December 28, 2014.


Thursday, December 4, 2014

The Role of Cuban Intelligence Gathering in Regime Sustainment

Due to the long stemming political and economic ramifications of the Cold War and the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, Cuba’s Ministry of the Interior continues to collect information on U.S. interests through a variety of methods for economic and regime sustainment reasons.  Paranoia and fear of U.S. regime removal may be involved in the overall cause and effect driving Cuba’s intelligence gathering against the U.S., but the main emphasis is economical regime sustainment as it generates hundreds of millions of dollars annually and is viewed as one of the primary revenue streams for sustaining the state (House of Representatives, p. 16).

U.S. sanctions against Cuba “issued by the U.S. Government on July 8, 1963, under the Trading With the Enemy Act” (U.S. Department of Treasury, p. 4) has left Cuba almost isolated under modern capitalist globalization, and as a result Cuba has learned the value of “providing America’s adversaries with an endless stream of U.S. secrets collected by its Signals Intelligence sites, complemented with reporting from traditional human spies” (House of Representatives, p. 16).  When the term ‘U.S. interests’ is mentioned in transcripts by the U.S. Congress and the U.S. government, it is not exclusive to political and military interests.  Quite frequently it means heavy private sector interests, and that elevates Cuba to more of an economic hindrance to U.S. private sector interests rather than an actual military or political intelligence threat.

Much of the success that Cuba’s Directorate of Military Intelligence has achieved in intelligence gathering on the U.S. has rippled down through the decades from the Cuban state’s Cold War experience with the Soviet Union in the form of KGB training and the “use of former Russian signals intelligence-gathering equipment” (Lefebvre , p. 460) that can be utilized due to Cuba’s close proximity of the United States.  Cuba’s Directorate of Military Intelligence is reported to have one of the most successful SIGINT programs on the international stage, most likely due to its success in targeting “White House communications, key military communications nodes, NASA and U.S. Air Force communications associated with rocket telemetry and commercial services dealing with financial and commodity communications” (House of Representatives, p. 16).  The private sector is mentioned in the citation as commercial services, financial communications and commodity communications, and to understand the scope of private sector espionage a reference can be made to the state of Pennsylvania affidavit concerning the Chinese intelligence gathering, or espionage, against Westinghouse concerning nuclear reactor contract bidding with the state of China (therefore private sector negotiating with state entities).  With this in mind, it is easy to see how Cuba can help sustain itself through an international “market place of U.S. secrets” (House of Representatives, p. 9) led by foreign and international private sector buyers.

In addition to Cuban SIGINT efforts against the United States, HUMINT and OSINT intelligence gathering methods are also successfully employed by Cuba due to large Cuban exile and immigration populations within the United States, especially in the state of Florida.  Not only can Cuban intelligence infiltrators gather political, military, and economic information which “can find its way to other major U.S. opponents and be used by them against U.S. interests” (Lefebvre, p. 453), but can also be used for or against competing private sector entities under international globalization.

Cuba takes advantage of its proximity to the United States through intelligence gathering and intelligence marketing in order to somewhat counter U.S. economic sanctions, and while it may not be able to avoid U.S. influenced regime change for the long term future, it has succeeded in regime sustainment since the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Department of the Treasury.  2012.  Cuba: What You Need to Know About U.S. Sanctions.  Office of Foreign Assets Control, January 24, 2012.  Accessed December 4, 2014.

Hearing Before the Subcommitte on the Western Hemisphere of the Committee on Foreign Affairs House of Representatives.  2012.  “Cuba’s Global Network of Terrorism, Intelligence, and Warfare” House of Representatives, May 17, 2012.  Accessed on December 4, 2014.

Lefebvre, St├ęphane.  2009.  “Cuban Intelligence Activities Directed at the United States, 1959–2007”.  International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 22, no. 3 (June 2009): 452-469.  Accessed on December 4, 2014.